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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This

appeal

arises

from

a

final

judgment

of

the

Fourth

Judicial District Court, Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Guy

R.

Burningham

presiding.

The Utah

Court

of Appeals

has

jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a3 (2) (k) (1992) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
In this matter the defendant below, Jordan North

("North"),

seeks a review of certain findings of fact entered by the trial
court.

North claims the evidence presented was insufficient and

the findings are "clearly erroneous."
North notes the standard of review on his appeal
clearly erroneous standard, citing Alta
846 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1993) and Gillmor

Industries

v. Wright,

Ltd.

is the

v.

Hurst,

850 P.2d 431 (Utah

1993) . However, North fails to set forth for this Court the entire
standard as stated in those cases.

In Alta Industries

the Court's

full statement the standard is as follows:
A party seeking to set aside a trial court's findings
carries a heavy burden: "To mount a successful challenge
to the correctness of a trial court's findings of fact,
an appellant must first marshall all the evidence
supporting the finding and then demonstrate that the
evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings
even in viewing it in the light most favorable to the
court below."
[citations omitted.]
Id.

at 1286.

Identical language is found in Gillmor.
1

Id.

at 433.

Plaintiff D. Scott Nuttall dba Nuttall Construction Company
("Nuttall") has filed a cross appeal.
raises four issues for review.

In his cross appeal Nuttall

However, Nuttall will address in

this brief only the following issue:
Whether the trial court erred in concluding as a matter
of law that prejudgment interest is not allowed on this
mechanic's lien foreclosure claim.
All other issues raised in the cross appeal are hereby waived.
Whether prejudgment interest is allowed is a question of law.
Accordingly,

the trial

court's

conclusion

reviewed under a correction of error standard.
Inc.

v.

Quintek,

City

Corp.,

on the question
Herm Hughes

834 P. 2d 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Warren

is

& Sons,
v.

Provo

838 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is mechanic's lien foreclosure action.

Nuttall is a

licensed contractor in Utah County, engaged in the business of
building and remodeling personal residences.

North was, at times

pertinent herein, the owner of a home located in Utah County.
Nuttall and North entered into a written agreement whereby Nuttall
agreed to remodel and make additions to North's home for the cost
of materials and labor plus ten percent.

When North breached that

agreement and failed to pay, Nuttall ceased any further work on the
residence, filing a notice of lien on December 13, 1991.

2

In response

to the complaint, North filed a counterclaim

alleging that Nuttall had breached the contract and that North had
overpaid for the work performed.
This matter was tried to the court beginning on March 9, 1994.
After two days of trial the matter was continued and concluded on
June 30 and July 1, 1994.

Following trial the court issued a

memorandum decision dated November 30, 1994.

(R. 1221)

post-trial motions, the memorandum decision was amended.

After

(R. 1269)

The trial court entered judgment in favor of Nuttall and against
North for the sum of $85,261.64 together with attorneys' fees in
the sum of $18,000.00.

However, the trial court refused to award

prejudgment interest on the amount of the judgment.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
North has included

in his brief a lengthy and convoluted

statement of the facts of this case.
includes in that

For the most part, North

statement only the testimony given by North,

ignoring the testimony of Nuttall and other witnesses.

Such a

recitation of facts is not necessary.

The only facts required to

understand this case are given below.

These facts are undisputed:

1.

Nuttall is a licensed general contractor in the business

of building and remodeling homes in Utah County.

(R. 696)

2 . North was the owner of a home located in Utah County with
the mailing address of 4545 Brookshire, Provo, Utah.
3

(R. 514)

3.

North hired numerous other contractors prior to Nuttall

for the purpose of attempting to remodel and make changes to his
home.

(R. 514-522)
4.

North retained Nuttall to finish the addition to and

remodeling of North's home on the basis of time and material plus
ten percent, all in accordance with a written agreement signed by
both parties.
5.
periodic

(R. 524; Exhibit 42)

During the course of the job, Nuttall sent frequent and
statements

accomplished,

to

including

North

indicating

the

labor and materials.

amount

of

Generally

work
these

periodic billings included a draw sheet and actual invoices from
subcontractors

and

suppliers.

Copies

of

the

billings

were

introduced, without objection, at the trial as Exhibits 1 through
36 inclusive.
6.

(R. 767-782; 798-806)

The total value of all

labor performed

and

material

supplied to the home of North in accordance with the agreement
between the parties was $686,396.69.
7.

(R. 809; Exhibit 41)

The undisputed amount of payments received from North by

Nuttall totalled $535,085.61, leaving a balance due of $151,311.08.
(R. 994-95; Exhibit 41)
8.

Nuttall ceased any further work on the home because of

non-payment by North.

At the time Nuttall walked off the project

there was much work left to be done and many items were incomplete.
4

Nuttall never sought recovery for these incomplete items, but only
the reasonable value of the work and materials actually furnished
to the project.

(R. 840)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Ample evidence exists to support the judgment of the trial
court.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §38-1-3

(1994), Nuttall is

entitled to the value of the services and materials supplied to
North's property.

The

evidence presented

clearly supports an award of $151,311.08.

to the trial

court

Not only did Nuttall

testify as to the cost of the work done, various subcontractors
hired

by

Nuttall

also

testified

as

to

their

work.

importantly, these subcontractors, without exception,

Most

testified

that the amount charged for the work on North's property was normal
and customary.

This testimony was completely uncontroverted by

North.
North has failed to meet the burden imposed on him by the
standard of review.

It is not appropriate for North to simply

reargue the facts of the case because the trial court disagreed
with his version.

Rather, it is incumbent upon North to first

marshall all of the evidence which tends to support the ruling of
the court and then show how that evidence is clearly erroneous.
Because North has wholly failed to meet this burden, his appeal
must be summarily denied.
5

On the issue raised by the cross appeal, it is Nuttall's
position

that

interest.

The

the

trial

court

prevailing

law

erred
is

in

that

denying

where

prejudgment

damages

can

be

ascertained through some objective and fixed standard, and where
such damages are not, transitory, discretionary or continuing,
prejudgment interest is appropriate.

In this case, the amount of

damages was fixed as of the lien filing date.

Nuttall was awarded

judgment for a portion of the fixed damages.

The portion awarded

was

itself

fixed

and

ascertainable.

Prejudgment

interest

is

therefore appropriate.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

NORTH HAS FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN UNDER THE STANDARD OF
REVIEW.

North states, at page 1 of his brief, that there are four
issues on appeal.
only one issue.
findings

of

In reality, however, North's brief deals with

Fairly summarized, North argues (Point 1) that the

fact

are

not

supported

by

the

evidence

and

are

therefore clearly erroneous.

North then argues

(Point 2) that

since

supported

evidence,

the

findings

are

not

by

the

conclusions of law are necessarily erroneous.

the

Thus, in effect,

North makes a single argument which is that the findings of fact of
the trial court are not supported by the evidence.
A.

North Has Failed to Marshall the Evidence.

The controlling

case law is uniform in imposing a very specific burden upon any
6

party who seeks to convince this Court that the trial court erred
in its findings of fact. The responsibility of the trial court is
to

consider

conflicting

testimony

and

evidence,

weigh

the

credibility of the witnesses and exhibits presented and make a
factual determination based upon what it sees and hears. As such,
the work of the trial court is given deferential review.
Grayson

Roper

Ltd.

v.

Finlinson,

See

782 P. 2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989) .

Given that deference, any party attacking the findings of the
trial court has a specific responsibility.

In order to have his

arguments even considered, the appellant must first set before this
Court every bit of evidence which tends to support the trial
court's findings and then show how, despite such evidence, the
findings of the court are clearly erroneous.
In Grayson,

the Supreme Court stated:

To successfully attack a trial court's findings of fact,
an appellant must first marshall all the evidence in
support of the findings and then demonstrate that the
evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings
against an a t t a c k , . . . .
Id.

at 470.

1992); Alta

See

also

Industries

Heslop

Ltd.

v.

Bank

v. Hurst,

of

Utah,

839 P.2d 828 (Utah

846 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1993).

More importantly, the case law is specific in its requirement
that the act of marshalling all evidence in support of the findings
is a condition precedent to consideration of the arguments as to
the sufficiency of the evidence.
7

In other words, unless the

appellant has successfully completed the task of marshalling, the
appeal is to be dismissed without further discussion.
The line of cases which illustrates this point begins with
Scharf

v.

BMG Corp.,

700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985).

In that case the

appellant attacked the trial court's factual findings, arguing that
the factual findings were not supported by the record.

The Supreme

Court summarily dismissed such arguments citing the appellant's
failure to marshall the evidence.

On that point the Court stated:

The challenges to the factual findings can be disposed of
readily. Erickson makes numerous arguments based on the
facts as he presented them to the trial court, rather
than on the facts as found by that court. . . . With
respect to these matters, we take as our starting point
the trial court's findings and not Erickson's recitation
of the facts. To mount a successful attack on the trial
court's findings of fact, an appellant must marshall all
the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and
then demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most
favorable
to
the
court
below,
the
evidence
is
insufficient to support the findings.
[citations
omitted]
Erickson has not begun to carry that heavy
burden. Nowhere does he marshall the evidence supporting
his version of the facts, much less the evidence
supporting the trial court's findings.
Under these
circumstances/ we decline to further consider Erickson's
attack on the factual findings.
Id.

at 1069-70 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Similarly, in Ashton

v. Ashton,

733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987), the

appellant's attack on findings was dismissed out of hand because
the

appellant

had

failed

marshalling all evidence.

to

meet

its

The Court stated:

8

threshold

burden

of

The Court begins its analysis with the trial court's
findings of fact, not with an appellant's view of the way
he or she believes the facts should have been found.
Defendants have not even begun to seriously discuss the
trial court's findings that dispute their version of the
facts.
In Scharf
v. BMG Corp, we explained the duty
incumbent upon an appellant to mount a successful
challenge to a trial court's findings of fact.
An
appellant must marshall all of the evidence in support of
the trial court's findings. Only then can we consider
whether those findings are "clearly erroneous•" Because
defendants have failed to make such a showing, the trial
court's findings will not be disturbed.
Id.

at 150 (emphasis added).
In the case at hand, North has, in the words of the Supreme

Court, "not even begun" to marshall the evidence supporting the
findings.

A fair reading of North's brief shows that it contains

nothing more than a rehashing and a reargument of North's version
of the facts.

At no point does North set out all of the evidence

on any specific factual finding which was presented by Nuttall and
then show that evidence to be insufficient.
For

example,

North

findings of fact 7 and 13.

attacks

the

word

"changes"

found

in

However, at no place in the brief will

the Court find a marshalling of the numerous references to changes
which were described by Nuttall and his subcontractors.

In order

to properly marshall the evidence on the issue of "changes", North
should have, at a minimum, noted the following testimony
Nuttall on this issue:

9

from

1.

Additional

work

in

contemplated by the contract.
2.

the

master

suite

not

originally

(R. 710)

No bid given for the additional work in the master suite.

(R. 712)
3 . Discussions regarding the fact these changes to the master
suite would result in additional time charges.

(R. 713)

4.

Changes to the office on the back of the house.

5.

Changes to the kitchen.

6.

Changes to the entry way.

7.

Further references to numerous changes.

(R. 716)

8.

Changes made by the interior decorator.

(R. 718)

9.

References to numerous other smaller changes.

10.

(R. 714)
(R. 715)

(R. 722)

Examples of work that was constantly changed requiring

"tear out and redo".
The foregoing
marshall

(R. 718-20)

Reference to the numerous times that Mr. North simply

changed his mind on work that was being done.
11.

(R. 713)

the

(R. 724)
is illustrative of the failure of North to

evidence

as

required

by the

standard

of

review.

North's idea of marshalling of such evidence is to state, at page
19 of his brief, that "Scott Nuttall's testimony is replete with
generalizations

that North was continually changing his mind,"

without even an attempt at a reference to the actual testimony.
The

record,

however,

is

replete
10

with

specific

instances

of

testimony given by Nuttall and by the subcontractors, all of which
was uncontroverted by North or his witnesses.

Assembling these

specific references and setting them before the Court are part of
North's burden.
Similar

analyses

of

North's

findings of fact can be made.
than argue

that

other

complaints

about

the

In essence, North does nothing more

the trial court

should not have believed

evidence, not that the evidence was insufficient.
trial making the same arguments.

the

North lost at

A retrial of the facts is not

appropriate before this Court.
North has failed to meet his threshold burden.

North knows

that if he were actually to marshall all of the evidence on these
various points, there would be but one conclusion:

that the trial

court's findings were supported by the evidence.

On this basis

alone, the North's appeal should be dismissed.
B.

There is Ample Evidence to Support the Findings of the Trial

Court.

It is not Nuttall's responsibility to show that there is

more than sufficient evidence to support each of the findings of
the trial court.

However, some examples of the testimony will

illustrate that the trial court was well within its right to enter
the

findings

entitled

of

fact

to judgment.

and

to

conclude

that

the plaintiff

was

North raises, in one form or another,

objections to the following findings:
11

1.

Findings 7 and 13. Examples of the specific evidence upon

which the trial court could rely for Findings 7 and 13 has been
given above.

In addition, numerous other witnesses testified as to

the constant changes and additional work which North requested.
For example, Mr. Bill Mammen, an architect, testified that he was
hired to make
structure

substantial

changes

to the second

floor of the

(R. 731) , that the changes were done on top of the

addition to the home

(R. 731) , that there were changes to the

kitchen over and above the addition to the home (R. 732) , and that
design changes were made to the entry way and to the recreation
room in the basement level.

(R. 733)

Mr. Scott Wright, a subcontractor, testified:
Yeah.
It was the common idea that when we came down
there was a change every time we came down.
(R. 595)

Mr. Wright then gave a specific example of the changes to

which he referred.

(R. 596-97)

Similar testimony was given by Mr.

Jerry Nielsen, a flooring contractor (R. 622), by Mr. Eric Hundley,
a painting contractor (R. 634), by Mr. David Johnson, a carpeting
contractor (R. 649), by Mr. Reid Erdman, an electrical contractor
(R. 663) , and by Mr. Russel Necaise, a masonry contractor.

(R.

674)
2.

Findings 8, 9 and 10. Apparently, North claims that these

findings are not supported by the evidence.
confusing, but ludicrous.
12

This claim is not only

Finding

No.

8 states Nuttall

maintained

records

performed and gave periodic billings to North.

of

work

The supporting

evidence is found in the first 36 exhibits, together with Mr.
Nuttall's clear testimony.

(R. 782-794)

North's claim that the

court had no basis for finding that Nuttall maintained records and
gave

periodic

billings

is

nothing

short

of

a

mystery.

Similarly, Finding No. 9 deals, in essence, with the fact that
North

requested

and

that

Nuttall

and

several

subcontractors

accepted trades in lieu of cash payments. Not only did Nuttall and
each one of the subcontractors testify as to trades, but North,
himself, admitted that trades were used.
that trade payments were made.
Finally,

Indeed, North stipulated

(R. 53 8)

Finding No. 10 states that Nuttall billed North

normal and customary charges plus ten percent.
one

of

the

subcontractors

listed

above,

On this issue each
without

exception,

testified that they billed normal and customary charges.
references to the record above.)

(See

More importantly, at no time did

North produce another contractor, another subcontractor or any
other expert who could speak on the issue of the amount billed by
Nuttall or who could give an opinion that the amount billed was in
excess of normal and customary charges for labor and materials.
3.

Findings 16, 17, 14 and 11.

In addition to the foregoing,

North at least mentioned, in passing, Findings 16, 17, 14 and 11.
13

It is respectfully submitted, however, that in his brief North does
nothing more than to argue against the findings.

There is no

evidence given in the brief to show how any of those findings are
incorrect.

All that North does is to argue either the weight to be

given

finding

the

or

the

fact

that

North

disagreed

with

the

finding.
A perfect example is North's treatment of Finding No. 16 on
page 31 of his brief.

There, after setting forth the finding

(which was to the effect that Nuttall had submitted a bill to North
on October 30, 1991) North argues:

"However, no evidence exists or

was presented that this letter/exhibit
whatsoever."

is accurate

in any way

The fact of the matter is that this exhibit was

offered at trial by North as evidence of what North thought was due
and owing as of the date of the statement.

(Exh. 44)

It is simply

incomprehensible that North, having introduced the exhibit himself,
would then argue that there is no basis for its sufficiency as
evidence.
C.

Conclusion.

North has failed miserably at marshalling for this

Court all of the evidence upon which the trial court could rely for
its findings.

Having failed, North is not entitled to be heard on

his arguments as to the sufficiency of the evidence which he failed
to set forth.

Even if North had met his burden, however, there is

a massive amount of information in the record upon which each of
14

the findings can be supported.

That North disagrees with the

conclusion made by the trial court is of no moment.
findings is adequately supported.

Each of the

North is not entitled to retry

his case before this Court. The appeal, in its entirety, should be
dismissed.
POINT II: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING
INTEREST.
The

trial

prejudgment

court

determined

interest

"[b]ecause

Nuttall
the

is

not

amounts

legitimately in dispute and unliquidated . . . ."

PREJUDGMENT
entitled

awarded
(R. 1291)

to
were
The

trial court's decision on this point presents a question of law
which this Court reviews for correctness.
Casualty

& Sur.

Co.,

Andreason

v.

Aetna

848 P.2d 171, 177 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Utah law on prejudgment interest is well established.

Whether

or not a claim is unliquidated or in dispute, prejudgment interest
should be awarded "in situations where the damage is complete, the
loss can be measured by facts and figures, and the amount of loss
Id.

is fixed as of a particular time."

trial court's own findings, the test

As demonstrated by the
for awarding

prejudgment

interest is satisfied in this case.
A.

The Damage is Complete and Can Be Measured As of a Particular

Time.

Under Utah law, prejudgment interest is generally allowed if

"the damage is complete and the amount of the loss is fixed as of
a particular time . . . . "

Bjork
15

v.

April

Industries,

Inc.,

560

P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977), cert, denied,

431 U.S. 930, 97 S. Ct.

2634 (1977).
In this case, the damage was complete and the loss fixed as of
the end of October 1991.

The trial court found North decided to

stop paying Nuttall in October 1991.
Nuttall

notice

of

parties' contract.

his

decision,

(R. 1292)

North on October 30, 1991.

(R. 1292)

North then gave

anticipatorily

breaching

the

Nuttall submitted his final bill to
(R. 1292)

When North refused to pay

the bill, Nuttall recorded his lien on December 13, 1991.

(R.

1292)
The trial court apparently concluded Nuttall's loss was not
fixed as of a particular time because North disputed the final
bill.

This conclusion effectively grants any party who might be

liable for prejudgment interest the power to avoid the liability by
simply disputing the amount of the underlying claim.
not support this anomalous result.

Utah law does

If entitlement to prejudgment

interest depended on whether the defendant disputed the principal
debt, prejudgment interest would almost never be awarded since, by
definition, a lawsuit involves an underlying dispute.
The law of prejudgment interest is not concerned with the
parties' dispute.

Rather, the proper focus of inquiry is on the

factors which allow certainty in calculation, such as complete
damages and a loss fixed as of a particular time.
16

See Andreason,

848 P. 2d at 177.

If these factors are present, and the loss can be

measured by facts and figures, it is of no consequence that one
party disputes the loss.
The

trial

court's

own

findings

establish

the

breach

of

contract and consequent damages were complete and fixed as of the
end of October 1991.

That North disputed the amount of loss does

not change the date it was complete and fixed.

The trial court

erred in concluding this dispute is the basis for denying rather
than awarding prejudgment interest.
B.

The Loss Can Be Measured by Facts and Figures.

The second half

of the test for determining entitlement to prejudgment interest
requires that the loss be measurable "by facts and figures . . . ."
Bjork,

560 P. 2d at 317. The question is whether the damages can be

ascertained through some objective, fixed standard, rather than an
assessment based on discretion or subjective judgment.
also

Andreason,

Id.;

See

848 P.2d at 177.

The trial court apparently concluded Nuttall's claim failed to
meet this part of the test since the claim was "unliquidated . . .
."

(R. 1291)

Nuttall respectfully suggests that the trial court

used the term "unliquidated" in an improper sense.
means "not ascertained in amount."
ed. 1983).

Blacks

"Unliquidated"

Law Dictionary

800 (5th

As the trial court found, Mr. Nuttall had ascertained

the amount of his claim by reference to the records he maintained.
17

(R. 1293)

That North disputed the amount ascertained by Nuttall

does not render the amount unliquidated.

Nuttall's claim was

liquidated from the date he recorded his lien.
More

importantly,

legally irrelevant.

whether

the

claim

was

unliquidated

is

Almost 90 years ago the Utah Supreme Court

recognized "where the damage is complete, and the amount of the
loss is fixed as of a particular time, there is -- there can be -no

reason why

interest

should be withheld

damages are unliquidated."
1003, 1006 (Utah 1907).

Fell

v.

The Fell

Union

merely because

Pacific

Ry.

Co.,

the

88 P.

court went on to emphasize the

point:
The true test to be applied as to whether interest should
be allowed before judgment in a given case or not is,
therefore, not whether the damages are unliquidated or
otherwise, but whether the injury and consequent damages
are complete and must be ascertained as of a particular
time and in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and
known standards of value, which the court or jury must
follow in fixing the amount, rather than be guided by
their best judgment in assessing the amount to be allowed
for past as well as for future injury, or for elements
that cannot be measured by any fixed standards of value.
Id.
11

at 107; see

also

Andreason,

848 P. 2d at 177

(noting that

[a] lthough damages may be unliquidated, they must be calculable

through a mathematically certain procedure allowing the court or
the jury to fix the amount . . .") .
Applying these principles to this case, the second part of the
prejudgment interest test is obviously satisfied.
18

Although the

trial court did not disclose the precise basis for its award, it is
apparent the court was guided by facts and figures

"and known

standards of value . . . " rather than its subjective judgment.
sum awarded, $85,261.64, is specific.
expected

The

An even, rounded number is

if the award can not be calculated with mathematical

accuracy.
Moreover, the trial court provides
calculations.

some

insight

into its

After concluding "the sum of $85,261.64 is due and

owing by the defendant to the plaintiff for labor and materials
furnished
offsets

. . .," the court notes

for

items

"[t]his amount includes all

that the plaintiff

did not

have

sufficient

documentation to support, and items for which the defendant was
charged and either did not receive or had to pay to have finished."
(R. 1291)

In other words, the trial court determined the amount of

its award using mathematical calculations, deducting for offsets
and overcharges. Nuttall's loss was measured by facts and figures,
satisfying the second part of the prejudgment interest test.
C.

Prejudgment

Interest is Routinely Allowed in This Context.

Mechanic's

lien

claims, by

particular

sum

demanded

as

statutory
of

a

prescription,

particular

involve

a

based

on

date

calculations made from documentary evidence, such as invoices and
payment ledgers.
kind

of

These attributes lend mechanic's lien claims the

certainty

courts

look

19

for

in

determining

whether

prejudgment interest will be allowed.

Because of this certainty,

prejudgment interest is almost always awarded in mechanic's lien
foreclosure actions.
A recent example from Kansas is J.
Greystone
Two

South

Partnership,

construction

Walters

Construction

v.

817 P. 2d 201 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991).

lenders

appealed

from

the

trial

court's

determination that contractors' mechanic's liens had priority over
certain mortgages.
entitled

The lenders argued the contractors were not

to prejudgment

interest
Id.

liquidated until trial."

since their

"claims were not

at 208. The appellate court held the

claims were sufficiently certain to allow prejudgment interest from
the date the liens were filed, despite the existence of offsets and
counterclaims.

See

Id.

at 208-10.

Likewise, in Horseshoe

Estates

v.

2M Co.,

Inc.,

713 P.2d 776

(Wyo. 1986), the property owner appealed the trial court's judgment
foreclosing a material supplier's mechanic's
prejudgment

interest.

unliquidated.
was

a

Again, the owner

lien and awarding

argued

the

claim

was

The Wyoming Supreme Court disagreed, noting "this

liquidated

claim because

it was

and

is

susceptible

of

Id.

at

calculation by reference to the contract and the invoices."
781.

Utah also recognizes the propriety of prejudgment interest in
the construction context.

In Davies
20

v.

Olson,

746 P.2d 264 (Utah

Ct.

App.

1987),

this

Court

affirmed

an

award

of

prejudgment

interest in favor of a contractor and against an owner.

Although

no enforceable contract existed between the parties, the Court
allowed recovery on a quantum
interest

should

be

meruit

awarded

theory and decided prejudgment

from

the

"date

that

acknowledged an obligation to pay plaintiffs . . . ."

See Triple

I Supply,

Inc.

v. Sunset

Rail,

Inc.,

defendants
Id.

at 270.

652 P. 2d 1298, 1301

(Utah 1982) (holding the "general rule for prejudgment interest in
Utah is that an unpaid subcontractor (materialman) is entitled to
interest from the contractor when the last materials have been
furnished and the payment therefor is past due.").
The common element in these cases is the ability of the court
to

set

the

damages

by

mathematical calculations.

reference

to

facts

and

figures

and

While the trial court is entitled to

some discretion as to which facts and figures it will accept, the
decision of the trial court is still based upon those facts and
figures, and not some discretionary or subjective standard.
In this case, the trial court determined the amount of its
award by reference to the evidence offered by Nuttall on the amount
due, and the evidence offered by North on offsets and overcharges.
The starting point for the court's calculation was the amount due
at the time North breached the parties' agreement.

The damage was

complete and the loss fixed on a particular date, with damages
21

calculable based on facts and figures. Prejudgment interest should
have been awarded.

The trial court erred in reaching a contrary-

conclusion.
CONCLUSION
North's appeal represents nothing more than an attempt to
rehash and reargue the facts. The defendant has given no attention
to

the

requirement

to

marshall

the

evidence.

If

a

proper

recitation of the facts and evidence had been presented it would be
apparent that the trial court was well within its bounds to enter
judgment in favor of plaintiff.

North's appeal should be denied.

Under the controlling law, prejudgment interest is appropriate
and should be awarded.

To deny prejudgment interest on the basis

that it was "disputed" gives to every debtor the right to avoid his
just debts by simply claiming that he does not agree with the
amount owed.

Accordingly, the matter should be remanded to the

trial court with instructions to award prejudgment interest from
the date of recording of the lien.
Under

Utah

statute

a

contractor

is

entitled

to

recover

attorneys' fees on a foreclosure action. Nuttall has been required
to defend this matter, yet again, before this Court.

The fees

expended by Nuttall on appeal were as necessary to the result as
were the fees expended at trial.

22

This Court should remand this

matter for further proceedings before the trial court including the
entry of additional attorneys' fees.
DATED this

day of November, 1995.
DART,/ADAJVIS0N & DONOVAN

CRAIG G. ADAMSON
DUANE R. SMITH
ERIC P. LEE
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